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"I don't want to be simply described as 'black.' I'm Cabliasian."
-Tiger Woods

Introduction'

There has been much talk over the past couple of years about the "race problem" in the
United States, but that is a relatively new term for a much older situation. It is a problem of
"other," the psychological concept that represent the part of our identity that we create through
the negation of other people and beliefs. When we feel that "other" is different enough, especially
if we believe that the very existence of this "other" is a threat to our own identity, we may seek to
reinforce our "self' through the destruction of the "other." Thus, groups of people work to
destroy each other, and this is largely the history of humanity. What makes "race" different?
Why is race such a hot issue for America? How do democracy and "other" mix in the issues of
race and minority and majority interaction?
This project is a collection of three essays that attempt to explain these and other
questions, and it represents almost two year's worth of research, discussion, and reflection for me.
The first essay, "The Concept of Race as defined by the United States Census Bureau," examines
the history of race in the U.S. and takes an in-depth look at its methods of enumeration and
definitions of race and color. The second essay, ''Democracy and 'Other, '" discusses the
psychological mechanisms at work in representative democracies and specifically examines the
psychological construct of "other" in political situations. The final essay, ''Mauritius and the
USA," is a quick comparison between the United States and the small island-nation of Mauritius,
which specifically addresses the topics found in the two previous essays with regard to each
country.

The Concept of Race as defined by the United States Census Bureau

Americans have long had a fascination with race. The concept and ideology of race
receives much attention from politicians, the media, and academia alike, however, much of the
population of the United States cannot even provide a most general definition of it. Even
researchers and thinkers who have dedicated their lives to studying and grappling with the
problems and concepts cannot agree on any single definition of it, and no one has yet been able to
provide the world with a scientific definition that could divide the world's population into "races"
with any respectable degree of scientific consensus. Yet race in American culture remains a
psychologically and sociologically fundamental concept, often being one of the first categories we
assign to people, whether meeting them for the first time in our neighborhood or conducting a
survey of the population.
The US Government is an excellent source for historically examining the concept of race.
It has had to deal with racial issues since its inception and is a fairly good model for the prevailing
attitudes and beliefs towards the subject at any time. The US Census Bureau has been forced to
deal with (or to ignore) the concept of race since the first Census (1790). This paper focuses on
the Census Bureau and its historical role in defining and dealing with the concept of race. In an
examination of racial typologies of different American historical periods, Marshall states, ''both
scientific and popular racial classifications reflect prevailing socio-political conditions."1

History and Lack of Scientific Basis for Race

The word "race" (from the German, ''Rasse'') was first used to distinguish large groups of
people by physical characteristics by Kant in 1775. The concept of race owes its scientific

beginnings to 18th Century zoologists who attempted to classify and categorize men as they had
earlier the animal and plant kingdoms. Carol von Linneaus classified all men into four ''varieties''
in his book, Systematic Naturae (1735). The varieties were Black, Red, White, and Yellow.
Linneaus used the color-coded designations to correlate the skin colors of major populations of
men with the similarly-coded body humors, of which, at the time, medicine believed various
combinations determined one's temperament. 2 The Linneaus system is most likely the basic
foundation for the current taxonomy of race. Once it had its scientific beginnings, scientific racial
debate proceeded in three stages. 3 First, in the 18th and 19th centuries, there was intense debate
between monogenic (single origin) and polygenic (multiple origin) positions. The polygenic
argument implied serious racial inequity thereby justifying the different attitudes towards whites
and blacks. The major source of the monogenic stance was the Creation story of the Bible. If
man came from the single source described in the Bible, and only had 6000 years to evolve the
racial varieties, then one could only naturally assume that human variation occurred rather quickly
and racial differences therefore did not represent any monumental changes. This argument
stemmed from the debate over whether the non-European peoples were capable of being
"civilized."
With the advent of Darwin and the assumption that adaptive changes occur over long
periods of time, however, the debate shifted. The realization that racial·differences might actually
be the result of long periods of evolutionary change was enough for many people to move
towards racial determinism. This, coupled with the even more dangerous pseudo-scientific ideas
of "social Darwinism" and Spencer's social "survival of the fittest," seemed to be plenty for some
to justify White supremacy. People were faced with the startling conclusion that racial
egalitarianism might actually be going against the laws of nature and "natural selection."4 Thus,
the second phase of the debate focused specifically on the equality or inequality of the races. The

corresponding political environment was one that turned a noncommittal or even supporting eye
towards Apartheid and the Jim Crow laws of the South that followed Reconstruction.
Only recently, in the third phase, was the concept of race reexamined and found wanting
by many. Ironically, the concept found its biggest setbacks coming in the area that had once been
its staunchest ally, genetics. As advancements were made in the field, it gradually became clear
that large classifications of people, readily identifiable by many fixed hereditary traits, simply did
not exist. Physical anthropologists took the genetic data and attempted to use it to clarify the
number and different attributes of races. They discovered two important things from genetic
comparisons between people of different races: 1) Homo sapiens as a species is rather
homogeneous throughout most of its genetic code, and 2) the external features that are
responsible for racial classifications are governed by a very small number of genes. The extremes
of skin color, the major determinant of race, differ by only 3 or 4 genes. Luca Cavalli-Sforza, a
pioneer in the field of genetic anthropology, states, "The genes responsible for these differences
[between races] are those that have reacted to climate '" We must bear in mind that the genes that
react to climate are those that influence external features ... the remainder of our genetic makeup

hardly differs at all."5 In fact, the two human groups who actually differ the most, based on
genetic difference, are Khoi-san Africans and Native Australians, groups that have developed
similar external, or "racial" features, in adaptation to their climates over time.6 Plus, the genetic
data lays out on world maps in gradations, suggesting that human migrations have produced
populations whose genetics change gradually over distance (see Appendix A) rather than
populations differentiated by sharp lines representing racial groups.7
Ashley Montagu was one of the first to state that races did not exist at all, pointing out the
almost absolute lack of biological coherence. He proposed that the term "ethnic group" be used
instead.8 ''Ethnic group" carries most if not all the sociological emphasis that "race" held but
downplays the importance of identifiable and intractable biological characteristics. This trend has

become more and more prevalent in usage for all groups except black Americans, for reasons we
shall tum to later. Montagu' s work historically corresponds with the Second World War and the
beginning of the Civil Rights movement and end of Jim Crow, which ushers in the third period, in
which the "colored problem" becomes euphemistically known as the "race problem." From
Montagu forward, race has become increasingly unpopular among anthropologists as time has
passed. In fact, a 1987 study found that 42% of biological anthropologists and 52% of cultural
anthropologists denied the very existence of biological races altogether.9

Folk Taxonomy of Race

Unfortunately, the scientific debate of the very existence of identifiable biological races has
gone largely unnoticed by the general American public. The reason for this seems to be the strong
influence that the ''folk taxonomy of race" possesses in the culture.to This is a holdover from
colonial America's cultural and economic make-up and has been allowed to fester by the lack of
scientific consensus at any historical point within the race debate. Early America consisted of
three readily identifiable, culturally and economically distinct groups: European colonists, African
slaves, and Native Americans. Naturally, the Linnean idea that man could be divided into several
large groups with certain characteristics appealed to Americans, who had it laid out before their
very eyes: Blacks, Whites, and Reds. For the ''whites,'' race presented itselfvery neatly with the
"Indian problem" and the "slave problem." But what is this "problem" and why is it a problem?
The problems arose from the friction generated by displacing entire populations of people. As
time progressed, the Indians were slowly eradicated, and the slave problem became the "colored
problem." Millions of Africans had been tom away from homeland and culture and brought to the
Americas as slaves. Then, slavery was abolished, and no one, including the new African citizens,
was quite sure what should happen next, as W.E.B. Du Bois said, ''What shall be done with the

Negroes?" I I This is the race question that dominates in American culture. Many former slaves
were willing to stay Americans, content to explore and define a new cultural identity for the
African-Americans, others wanted to return to Africa and return to their forebears' ways. This
uncertainty about the place and role of blacks in American society combined with other
Americans' indifference and at times hostility towards all blacks. In it's most recent incarnation,
this friction has become simply known as the "race problem." This final categorization of the
friction is telling. It acts as its own indictment. It's not the problem of race but the problem with

race. The artificial lines dividing large groups of people in our society breed nothing but equally
artificial problems. The constant source of the problem is the deeply ingrained folk taxonomy of
race. The antiquated belief in the races of man, combined with the more global problems of
stereotyping behavior produces the misperceptions and prejudices that plague the US to this day.
The folk taxonomy of race has its roots in the colonial era. It was often referred to as the
Age of Enlightenment or the Age of Man. Philosophic and technological breakthroughs were
changing the nature ofEuro e. It was also the age of conquest and genocide. The war was made
upon all the other peoples of the Earth, and the conquest yielded raw materials, tom away from
others' lands, and unlimited human labor in the form of slaves. As Frantz Fanon stated in The
Wretched of the Earth, ''Europe was built upon the blood and gold of the rest of the world."12
Specifically, in the Americas, gold, silver, and lumber were stripped from the land, millions of
native Americans were either killed outright or fell victim to disease, and millions of Africans were
brought over in chains to work in the sugar and cotton fields. How did the men and women of
Europe and European America rationalize the rape and conquest of colonialism with the ideals of
the Enlightenment? The folk taxonomy of race filled this gap in reasoning, allowed the
non-European peoples of the world to be labeled "sub-human" and thus justly conquered and
enslaved, or at least no cause of real concern. This has lingered within the American psyche long
after the end of the colonial era.

The US Government has historically been involved with almost all aspects of the race
debate, at times enthusiastically and at times very reluctantly. As the Government's sensory organ
for the population, the US Census Bureau has always been responsible for categorizing and
organizing the population. This categorization of the people has reflected the current prevailing
views of race and ethnicity. Thus, the Census Bureau is an excellent tool for historically
examining the evolution of race in America. This part of the paper examine the US Government's
Census policies and practices.
The first US Census was conducted in 1790 with following ones conducted every ten
years. The 1790 Census listed the head of each family in each state by name, the number of males
and females aged under and over 16 (whites only, but it doesn't say this) living in the household,
the number of ''free coloureds", and the number of slaves.13 The simplicity of the information
gathered on African-Americans is telling. The young government wanted a tally of its citizenry
(which didn't include slaves) and was small enough to do it by state and name. Most everyone
else in the country at this point was of primarily Anglo-Saxon origin, which represented the
"default" group. The Census told only how many people of African origin there were in America
and how many were free versus slaves in each state. This reflects the Government's lack of
concern with the topic of race and slavery that is mirrored almost throughout the slavery era,
during which the Government's limited concerns deal with the "slave problem." Since most of the
blacks in America were slaves, they were under control. There was only a need to check how
many slaves per state there were totally and per household for economic reasons. At this point
the government had not yet begun to worry about the race problem.
Things remained fairly static for the Census Bureau up through the Civil War, when in
1870, it had to treat all blacks as free coloreds and added counts for Chinese, Japanese, and

Native Americans. The Chinese and Japanese were immigrant workers in the West that had come
with the gold rushes. They weren't considered to be "white," but they didn't seem to be ''black''
either. To fit into America's neat mythical racial picture, it seemed that they should all be ushered
into some umbrella-like "yellow" race, but since it didn't work out as neatly, and there was no
precedent, they were listed by national origin (since, unlike most blacks, the point of origin was
known), betraying the first cracks in America's race mythos. The many Native Americans on US
territory resisting being moved to reservations at this point were still considered hostile and
therefore better counted when dead if at all. The Census doesn't even include them as part of the
regular Census until 1890 when they were finally brought under U.S. government control on
reservations.14
In the 20th Century, the waves of immigrants from all over the world began to make the
Census Bureau's job much harder. The Census Bureau was completely unable to apply the race
category to this sampling of the world and for a simple reason: the American and European racial
'laxonomies" do not represent a global theory of race. They are simply local, antiquated social,
economic, and political support systems that enforced colonial rule (which is one reason all the
major former colonies in the Americas each have their own version of a racial caste system though
what it means to be ''black'' in Brazil is different than in Cuba and they both are different from the
racial definitions in the United States). The Census Bureau's "General Report" on the 1930
Census provides a good example of the problem:
"The classification of the population of the United States by color or race distinguishes in many
cases only three main groups, namely, white, Negro, and "Other races." The "Other race"
group includes Mexican, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Hindu, Korean, Hawaiian, Malay,
Siamese, and Samoan."IS
This excerpt clearly shows the American folk taxonomy of race, and its inadequacies in
dealing with groups other than ''black'' and ''white.'' There is only a weak attempt to preserve the

racial system by inanely creating the group "Other races," which includes such random groups as
Native Americans and nationalities as diverse as Mexican and Siamese, even a religious group,
Hindus (see Appendix C). Again, the Census is mainly interested in who's black and white, the
classic American racial make-up, and the foundation for the whole American theory of race.
Everyone else, indeed, the entire rest of the world, is just "Other races."
The ''Race or Color" category on the Census has always been what's known as a "100%
category," meaning that every member of the population must put down an answer for that
question. The 100% answering mark can only be demanded of categories that apply to every
single person in the country such as sex, marital status, and age. To ensure that the 100% mark
for race was reached, the enumerators were to ascertain the race or color of each person by
observation.16 Of course, this also ensured that a certain standard of racial classification was
maintained.
The government gave its Census-takers guidelines for determining the answer to the race
question. Up until 1970, if the enumerator came to the home, he determined the race by
observation alone, proving that race is entirely determined by external appearance. If he was
unsure of the race, he could ask the person, but only to provide a clue as to which race should be
answered. If the Census form was filled out by the individual themselves, and the race question
was left blank, then the race of other members of the household was used, or, if the entry was
blank for the entire household, then the race of the head of the preceding household was used.
The two assumptions at work in this policy were that everyone in any given household, and their
neighbors,·would all be members of the same race, and, with segregation firmly in place and
miscegenation frowned upon, the assumptions, however revealing, were not statistically
damaging.
The 1960 Census brought massive changes to the "race question." Not coincidentally, the
beginning of the Civil Rights Movement and the end of Jim Crow (the dawn of the "race problem"

era and the end of the "colored problem" era) corresponded with the first race disclaimer by the
Census Bureau.
"The concept of race, as used by the Bureau of the Census, is derived from that which is
commonly accepted by the general public. It does not reflect clear-cut definitions of biological
stock, and several of the categories used obviously refer to national origin."
Even with the glaring contradiction (even in 1997, it is commonly accepted by most of the
general public that race does reflect clear-cut definitions of biological stock, and the Census
Bureau almost admits that itself, the general public, and the concept of race are wrong), the
disclaimer is a bold step (if a small one) away from the racial caste system. This statement also
shows the two-way nature of the Census's and government's treatment of the concept of race and
the classification of its population in general. The government admits that its concept of race is
"derived from what is commonly accepted by the general public," but also, the government puts
forth to the general public, a relatively new concept, that race doesn't reflect any clear biological
stock. The degree to which the government can dictate beliefs and classifications to the people is
an extremely important issue currently with the latest changes in the Census definitions of race.
The 1960 Census (see Appendix D) also heralds a reshuffling of the "main groups" divined
by the race question, potentially signifying a shift in the "other-self' organization of the default
("white") population (see also "Democracy and 'Other'''). Instead of "white," ''Negro,'' and
"Other races," representing the "main groups" in the racial classification of the American
citizenry, the 1960 Census report claims that the population now breaks down into ''white'' and
"nonwhite" super-groups.
"The term "color" refers to the division of the population into two groups, white and
nonwhite. The group designated as nonwhite consists of Negroes, Indians, Japanese, Chinese,
Filipinos, Aleuts, Eskimos, Hawaiians, part-Hawaiians, Asian Indians, Koreans, Malayans, and
other racial or ethnic groups of non-European or non-Near Eastern origin."17

Does this reconfiguration represent a change in the white American perception of "other"?
No, in social and cultural terms, all of those "nonwhite" groups are distinct from default American
society, and, in racial terms, nonwhite is defined as the "Negro" race, and myriad nationalities and
ethnicities. In other words, socially, the groups are "white" and "other" (nonwhite). Racially, the
groups are still, "white," "black," and "other," where "other" is made of nationalities and
ethnicities. It makes very little sense that the race question on the Census divides the American
population into all people of light-skinned European origin, all people of dark-skinned African
origin, and individual Asian nationalities. The explanation is that "race" has two meanings in the
United States. The original meaning was the pseudo-scientific taxonomy system, mentioned
earlier in this essay, which served to differentiate between the European settlers and their African
slaves. The later function of race is separate who is ''white,'' or default, and who is "other," but
the fact that the race categorization can so easily switch to include nationalities and ethnic groups
in addition to racial groups suggests that its only real function ever was to separate the default
population from the "other." This is why the "race" categories of this, and later Censuses, not
only include race in the original form (e.g. ''black''), but also nationalities (e.g. ''Korean'') and
ethnic groups (e.g. ''Hawaiian'').
The 1960 Census included at least some self-enumeration on the race question, although
Census-takers still worked on a general policy of observation. Self-enumeration works well
because people tend to label themselves as they would be labeled. However, this is not always the
case, and the fact that the Census included an "Other (please specify)" category, opened the door
for future resistance to the racial encoding of the question (although the "Other (please specify)"
entries were later interpreted and filed into existing racial categories by Census-workers).
The next significant change occurs in the very next (1970) Census: the government fully
adopts its "self-enumeration" or "hand' s-off" policy of racial classification. With the success of
the Civil Rights Movement and meteoric rise of minority group nationalism during the 1960' s, the

race issue became so politically-charged (and therefore dangerous) that the "hand' s-ofP' policy is
not surprising. It is also another admission or acknowledgment that the race system is inherently
flawed and that the government should distance itself from it. The 1970 Census also drops the
contradiction·from its race disclaimer, simply stating that race "does not denote any scientific
definition of biological stock."17
Although self-enumeration is a large step away from government enforcement of racial
encoding, it still serves the original purpose of the Census race question (to count "other")
because the racial system and the folk taxonomy of race have such a strong hold on the American
people that they will police themselves. Because group identity is part of self-identity, people will
defend it vigorously, even to the point of continuing a system that is harmful to them, and in
America, there are few group identities stronger than the racial identities. This fact isn't
surprising, considering the amount of abuse some groups have taken and continue to take, as a
group.
The 1980 Census was not substantially different from the 1970 Census. The
self-identification policy was maintained, as was the "white," ''black,'' "nonwhite" (and
"nonblack") nationalitieslethnicities categorization. One change was that people who put
''Hispanic'' or "Latino" or a Hispanic nationality in the "Other (please specify)" slot were left there
as "nonwhite" whereas previously, in 1960 and 1970, they had been included in ''white.'' This
reflects both the rise of Hispanic nationalism in the 1970' s and the corresponding "otherizing" of
Hispanics with the large increases in immigration from Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Mexico.19
Another major change, although not numerically, was that Asian Indians were assigned
their own race question category. Up to that point, Asian Indians had been included in the
"white" category on the Census, although briefly, in the 1930-1940 versions, many Asian Indians
would have qualified for the ''Hindu'' category.20 The reason for the addition was likely an
increase in the Asian Indian population of America made them a large enough group to gain

"other" status, and thus, by being non-default, no longer "white" (the move also roughly cut the
total global population of the "white race" in half, with about one billion Asian Indians abruptly
becoming "other"). The 1980 Census also increases the number of Asian and Pacific Islander
groups reporting from 5 in 1970 to 12 (see Appendix E), including an umbrella "Other Asian and
Pacific Islander" groUp.21
The 1990 Census takes the division of the Asian and Pacific Islander groups to the
extreme, however, by jumping from 12 to 51, including such groups as ''Bhutanese'' and
''Northern Mariana Islander," all under the "race" item (see Appendix F). The Census adds again
to its disclaimer, which has accompanied every Census since 1960, "furthermore, it is recognized
that the categories of the race item include both racial and national origin or socio-cultural
groups." Once again, it is apparent that the race item and the function of "race" in general is to
report "default" and "other" rather than the person's "racial" group. 22
The reason for the dramatic increase in reported groups in the race item is linked directly
to the self-identification policy of the Census Bureau, not to any corresponding increase in
immigration and "otherizing" of these myriad groups. In the political and social climate of the
past few decades, many groups have felt it in their best interest to assert themselves as "minority
groups," in effect, declaring themselves as "other." This is a reversal of the previous trend among
newly immigrated groups, many of which tried to assimilate as quickly as possible into the
"default" American group. The most notable of these groups is the Hispanics with the Chicano
movement of the 1960' s and 1970' s, but the trend can been seen above in the increase of groups
reporting.
With the 1990 Census, the United States Census Bureau marks 30 years of denying ''the
concept of race .. . clear-cut definitions of biological stock." If the concept of race, which is based
entirely on external appearances (clearly a function of biology), doesn't reflect clear-cut
definitions of biological stock, then is that not contradictory, invalidating the category as a whole?
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And, if the definitions are simply not clear-cut, then how can the category possess any statistical
veracity? The answer to the first question is has been provided many times by sociologists and
cultural anthropologists: race may not be a scientifically or genetically coherent category, but it
still holds major significance as a social or cultural category, and therefore should be researched
and used in population studies. This, of course, is an entirely reasonable and sensible argument,
but it should be pointed out that the only reason Hrace" holds any social or cultural significance

as a category is that most of the population still believes in the myth of race as a clear-cut
biological category. Ifmost people recognized race as an artificial classification, it wouldn't have
such social, political, and cultural clout.
The second question and its implications have received national attention recently with the
Census Bureau's announcement of a new "multiracial" or "multiethnic" category to be included in
the next (2000) Census. The announcement and the ensuing discussion have raised questions
about the "lines" in between races. What about people of mixed-race? Are the children of one
white parent and one black parent, black or white? Tiger Woods, the young golf professional
making waves in the sport, when asked about his feelings on being the first black man to win the
Masters, replied that he didn't like being simply described as ''black'' because of his European,
South-East Asian, African, and Native American heritage. Tiger Woods could been seen as a
role-model for multiracial people, but others criticize that since the media, the people, and indeed,
the whole world, see him as ''black,'' then that is the group with which he should identify.
The argument around the new "multiracial" category for the race item is very political,
although it does represent a general feeling of dissatisfaction with the traditional racial encoding
among the people. Many liberals and traditional minority-rights groups are opposed to the new
category, fearing that it will weaken their continuing struggle for rights and lead to undercounts in
Civil Rights Compliance verifications.

The "multiracial" category, however controversial, further reveals the lack of substance in
the traditional taxonomy of race. Any question that has as a valid answer "all (or none) of the
above" explains nothing and everything at the same time. The question will actually give no
valuable information statistically, yet it divulges that the question itself is flawed somehow. The
Government of the United States of America does still need to follow certain groups to prevent
discriminatory practices from infringing upon their Civil Rights, but it also needs to educate its
citizenry (of all "racial groups") and banish the folk taxonomy of race from its heartland.

DEMOCRACY AND "OTHER"

Representative democracy has long been viewed as the pinnacle of national development,
considered to be far superior to other more autocratic and totalitarian forms of government.
Ideally, of course, this is true. There is no better way to guarantee the rights of the people and
protect them from oppression than by giving them final say over who controls the government.
Since the global spread of democracy began in earnest, however, many fledgling democratic
governments have collapsed into totalitarianism or autocratic military rule. Why has this "higher"
form of government not succeeded in so many of the countries where it has been instituted? The
answer lies in the type and makeup of each country's voting population.
Democracy depends on the will of the majority representing what is the country's best
interests. The majority's interests, however, may not be the same as the remainder of the
population's, and, in fact, can be extremely contrary to minority groups' interests. Although this
has been a problem from time to time in the world's leading democracies, they manage to avoid
major problems because they consist, almost without exception, of large, fairly homogenous
populations that possess strong national identities (which almost always means that whatever
minority groups that might once have existed, have been destroyed, controlled, or silenced in
some way in the past). The interests of the majority in these cases, often closely approximate the
needs the majority of the nation. Great Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Italy, Japan, and the
United States are the world's most successful democracies, and they also have some of the
strongest national identities and make up the G7, the most powerful global economies. They are
also, not coincidentally, some of the most imperialistic nations for which that near mythically
strong national identity is a pre-requisite. At least all of them have powerful majority groups that
believe in a strong national identity, even if most or all of the identity is folklore or legend.

Many countries, especially developing countries that are still overcoming the effects of
colonialism, have neither a homogenous population nor a strong national identity. In fact, many
developing nations are patchworks of several, even dozens of different ethnic groups that don't

see themselves as having common interests, and that were themselves independent entities prior to
colonization. Needless to say, not many of these countries have any national identity at all, let
alone strong ones. Many times, this situation is a result of poor or misguided planning on the part
of the departing colonial governments which were often corrupt and favored one ethnic group
over all the others. In the case of Africa and the Middle East, many nations were created that had
never existed in any form before (but where people had lived for tens of thousands of years),
drawn up in meeting rooms in Europe over tea between the "mother" countries and their native
sympathizers (usually members of one elite group). These countries, with almost arbitrary
borders that cut large ethnic groups into halves and even thirds, almost inevitably have major
problems with either democracy or human rights, and the left-out ethnic and religious groups are
often brutally oppressed by the majority. The Kurds, Palestinians, Oromo, Tutsis, and Hutus, are
all examples of left-out or displaced ethnic groups that have suffered at the hands of their
governments or each other.
The instances where democracy has failed give us fascinating insight into the dynamics and
mechanisms at work in democracy. Inevitably, democracies produce different factions within the
population. That is a good thing. Democracies can thrive on differences: political parties
working against and with each other can produce a safer and stronger nation than one with only
one ruling party. Furthermore, groups in opposition can prevent extremism and force
compromise. But, if the differences are too great, if the people feel that they have no common
ground with members of the other groups, the system can breakdown, with groups resorting to
violence to protect their interests. What are the factors that decide whether differences are too
great? When do the differences between opposing groups supersede the commonality of
nationalism and lead to a systemic failure? These are the questions that this essay will attempt to
address by investigating the psychological mechanism of the "other."
One of the ways that individuals construct their self-identity is to form an idea of who they
are not. They identify themselves by negation of other groups. These groups begin to form the
psychological construct of "other" which plays a very important part in human behavior both

group and individual. The psychological construction of the "other" occurs primarily during the
pre-pubescent and adolescent years and is built through the individual's interaction with groups
with which they do identify. For example, pre-pubescent males begin to formulate a gender-based
self-identity by identifying females as "other," which is one reason many young boys would be
mortified to be caught playing with Barbie dolls or other such "girl" toys. Early adolescent males
narrow their self-identity and form an additional sexual identity "other" when they identify
homosexuals as "other," which is why one of the gravest schoolyard insults to many boys is of the
"sissy" or "homo" variety. "Other-ness" is dependent on stereotypes. The young men who
engage in such schoolyard behavior have almost certainly never had any experience with
homosexuals that they can recount as negative, justifying their animosity. But they probably are
all familiar with the "sissy" and "gay" stereotypes, which symbolizes this "other." Unfortunately
this is also the stage in life when many children in the US are faced with racial issues, too often
forming strong "others" for different racial groups, which suffer greatly from stereotypes.1
"Other" can be built on, added to, and changed throughout life however. As people grow
to adulthood, learn a trade, get employed, and go through the trials of life, they change who they
identify with, and conversely, who is "other" to them. For many people, political affiliation and
philosophy is a large part of self-identity. The stronger a sense of self-identification with a party
or philosophy is, usually the stronger a sense of who (or sometimes what) is "other." This is why
this psychological construct is such an important part of the dynamics of democracy. Subscribers
of one political affiliation often feel a degree of kinship to those who hold close to the same
beliefs and often feel equally negative feelings towards those who hold the "other" beliefs.
"Other" mental status is not an on/off switch, it is a gradation, group by group, which is why
democracies can function in such a myriad of ways around different issues. Some people don't
identify strongly at all with many issues and thus, those who hold different beliefs are not so
foreign . Other times, people are, or become, strongly attached to issues and include the issues as
part of their self-identity, what makes them who they are. This is when democracy is put to the
test because when people feel that their beliefs of this magnitude are threatened, they can respond

with violence to protect themselves and their identities. This has been the downfall of many
prospective democratic nations. It is also why a strong national identity is important for the
success of democracy. If most citizens of a country include a strong national identity as part of
their self-identity, especially if democracy and democratic issues are part of that identity, then they
are far less likely to sacrifice the nation or its democratic ideals in the name of anyone issue or
group. For example, a Republican is unlikely to sacrifice the American national identity, along
with its democratic ideals, in the struggle against the Democrats. And many times, in many
democratic countries, this is the case: most would not risk or threaten the stability of the nation in
the name of any one issue.
However, people in the US are by no means free of the problems of "other" and
democracy. The long history of race and racism in the Americas permeates every democratic
issue of the nation. The very fact that Hispanic-, African-, Native, and Asian-Americans are
considered to be voting blocks is evidence enough that group identity and politics are closely
combined. But who is exactly "other" in America, the land of the immigrant assimilation and the
"melting pot"?
Of course the "others" depend on whom one has picked as the "self" The median
American, at least for a little while longer, is a person of mostly European ancestry. This person,
on average, identifies themselves with two main groups: their gender, and the "default" American.
''Default'' here simply means non-black, non-Hispanic, non-Asian, non-gay, non-handicapped,
Christian, who presumably is a hard-working, over-taxed member of the middle-class, in other
words, members of the American general population, both male and female, who have never
identified themselves with any of the American "other" populations and who ascribe to the
American dream and myth of the "middle class." Although the number of people who actually fit
that description is nowhere near a majority, the number of people who identify with that group or
believe that most other people do is a majority, especially of the voting population. Many of the
people who would include themselves in that group are much poorer than the "middle class,"
some are far richer (as shown so exquisitely recently when a politician, whose family's earnings

rose above $175,000 a year, proudly declared himself a member of the "upper middle class"), and
even more are not as hard-working as the mythical American.
The problems of self-identity are not monopolized by white middle America. Many
groups have struggled with their group-identities over the years. African-Americans,
Hispanic-Americans, Asian-Americans, and homosexuals, just to name a few, have fought long
and hard to forge solid group identities, distinct from the American default of heterosexual
"white." It has not been easy, as there is often much disagreement in which direction the identity
should be growing.
A solid group identity is an absolute necessity in our democracy as we have seen,
however. Without a strong, clear, united voice, backed up by votes, a group's needs have a good
chance of being ignored by their government. If African-Americans had not formed a strong
group identity and struggled to make their voice heard, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 might not yet
have been passed. Unfortunately, since many of the economic ~d social problems are racially
encoded (African-Americans, on average, make less money, go to poorer schools, have more
health problems, die younger, and get stiffer prison sentences for comparable crimes than whites),
the solutions and groups to lobby the democratic system for them are often racially encoded as
well. For example, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, is directly
responsible for many advances in racial problems and indirectly responsible for many, many more,
but their very existence also propagates the artificial "other" category that race represents in
America.
This has begun to cause problems of self-identity for many Americans who might be
thought of as one ethnic or racial group but who are racially mixed. Many Americans feel that the
traditional system of racial encoding does not adequately describe them at all. Most of these
people are children of racially mixed marriages who reject the traditional race categories, and who
are stirring the first callings for both a reexamination of racial categories and a new "multiracial"
category (described in "The Concept of Race and the U.S. Census Bureau"). While this is a noble
rejection of the artificial categories of race that do nothing but divide, it causes serious problems

for the groups that are trying to protect these same individuals from racial oppression and
discrimination (which do still present significant problems in our time) that will affect them, no
matter their actual racial make-up. Democracy only protects groups that protect themselves, and
groups that are unclear of their self-identity are unable to do that as well as strong groups. The
more individuals there are that legally declare themselves "multi-racial," that is, that they are no
longer ''black,'' ''Hispanic,'' or "Asian," the less of a voice each of those corresponding minority
and minority-advocacy groups have, which could lessen their ability to oppose discriminatory
practices affecting their group. The problems of self-identity are clear, however: we are as
confused about ourselves as we are about who "others" are.
The inadequacies of stereotypes in describing reality becomes painfully apparent when
their reliance on emotion and lack of logic are exposed to the world. Unfortunately, they are
often the only tool at hand for defending one's conception of "other." As we have seen, the
primary requirement for "other" status in the mind is a person who fills the category "not-me," a
person that one does not identify as being similar to oneself. This distinction can be as narrow as
which neighborhood one lives in or which high school one attended ("Ilwe went to Duckberg
High, they went to Goosetown"), or as broad as what "race" one is or one's religion or nationality

("Ilwe am/are black, they are white," "Ilwe am/are Hindu, they are Muslim."). The distinction can
also vary in strength for place to place, person to person, and group to group. Catholics and
Protestants live completely peacefully side-by-side in the US; they don't represent strong "other"
groups for one another in America. In Northern Ireland, however, Catholics and Protestants view
themselves and each other as near the highest degree of "other" and are often willing to resort to
violence to "protect" their identities. Thus, "otherness" can vary in both scope and magnitude,
depending on circumstance.
A person or group's reaction to "others" is dependent on the degree to which they feel
their self-identity is threatened by the "other." The perception of threat from an "other" is
(almost) always dependent on the stereotype that defines the mental category. When a white
person is complaining about "those damn blacks" (for the purpose of the example any "other"

group can work here, such as Muslims, homosexuals, Catholics, Jews, Asians, or Hispanics, and
one can also substitute a member of any group into the complaining role), they usually are not
speaking of a specific person, rather they are speaking of the stereotype that forms their
conception of "other," or, worse yet, they are speaking of a specific person, letting that single
person or group represent the whole "other" (thus, in effect, forming a new or different stereotype
or strengthening an existing one). In that complaining, they are reaffirming their self-identity, by
separating themselves from perceived negative behavior in an exercise of what is known as the

social-gain theory.2 This theory states that one of the causes of this behavior (specifically to the
theory: racism, but it applies to all "other-self' dichotomies) is the social, and thus, psychological
and potentially economic, gain that comes from exploiting existing stereotypes of other groups to
the favor of one's own group. An excellent example of the social-gain theory at work in America
is provided by David KunstIer's The Wages of Whiteness in which he closely examines the
integration of the Irish into white America in the Nineteenth Century through negation by their
efforts to draw distinctions between themselves and blacks, who were their main competition for
both low-income labor positions and the bottom of the social ladder at that point in history.3
Their efforts were successful, and they changed their social standing at least in part by enforcing
and reinforcing the "other-ness" of African-Americans.
Up to this point, we have only examined one side of the mechanisms of democracy. The
people, groups, and their interactions are only half the issue of democracy and "other." Not only
do the complexities of democracy and "other" cause problems on their own in the population,
these problems can be aggravated and even multiplied exponentially by politicians and others who
exploit the differences between groups to expand their own political fortunes and agendas. Not
surprisingly, this concept is known as the political-gain theory.3 Once again, this theory was
meant to describe racism, which it does exceptionally well~ it also describes the way in which any
two or more groups can be maneuvered into politically-or-otherwise favorable opposition through
manipulation of the "other" categories of groups. In the United States, one of the world's oldest
"modern" democracies, it is one of the oldest and time-tested methods for increasing one's

political worth or manipulating large groups in general. A recent quote in a Knoxville
News-Sentinel editorial sums up American politics quite well, ''Ethnic politics are as American as
Chinese takeout. "5
"Other" and "self' are crucial concepts in understanding an individual's identity. "Self'
represents the concepts, images, issues, stereotypes, and beliefs that make up a person. That
which defines "self' is often inseparable from that which is not "other," the concepts, images,
issues, stereotypes, and beliefs that a person believes do not represent who they are. Thus, we
often define our identity by ruling out what we are not. Since individuals make up groups, and
since these individuals chose to join groups of people who they feel closely resemble themselves,
and since group selection is entirely dependent on the individual's "other-self' dichotomy, group
behavior is tied closely to who the group sees as "other."
In representative democracies, where "majority rules," who the main political groups see
as "other" and the degree to which they feel "other" is different from themselves can vastly affect
the political climate. Nations that have strong national identities tend to be more stable, as
different political groups tend to view themselves as having the common national interest. Since
the voting majority is the common national interest, majority rules without too much conflict.
Nations that do not have strong national identities are more prone to violence and dissolution
because the political groups see their own issues as taking precedence over those of the nation.
Thus, a key to the success of representative democracies is the presence or formation of a national
identity among the population.

''Mauritius and The USA"

Mauritius is a small island-nation in the south-western part of the Indian Ocean.
Uninhabited until Europeans colonized it in the 17th Century, it has become one of the most
culturally and ethnically diverse nations in the world. The French were the first to permanently
colonize Mauritius, and they brought in slaves from Africa to work the vast sugar plantations
which sprung up around the island.
The British took the island as booty after the defeat of Napoleon as it was of great
strategic importance to the sea route from Europe to India before the Suez Canal was built, but
they did little to influence the French and emerging Creole cultures of the island. They did,
however, outlaw slavery, instead choosing to bring in cheap, indentured labor from India to work
the sugar fields. Soon, those of Indian descent, both Hindu and Muslim, outnumbered the African
and ever-dwindling French populations. While part of the British Empire, Mauritius attracted
people from other parts of the world, notably Chinese, who came as entrepreneurs. All these
people converged on this previously uninhabited tropical island to form what has been rightly
called, "a microcosm of the world."
Like Mauritius, the United States of America is made up of peoples from many different
parts of the world. Unlike Mauritius, where each culture keeps much of its language, customs
and religion in a cultural plurality, the US has assimilated its immigrants into the single
mainstream culture. This essay will attempt to address the major similarities and differences
between the two nations by focusing on how each nations' government separates and classifies its
own population, and how each nations' political environment is affected its ethnic and racial
make-up.
The US Government's instrument for counting and sorting it's population is the US
Census Bureau. Throughout its history, the US Census Bureau has differentiated between the

original European colonists and the slaves they brought from Africa. The designations have
changed over the years, with "slave" being replaced by "colored," ''Negro,'' ''black,'' and more
recently, "African-American." In the original census, there was no special designation for what
today we call "white," it was, and remains, simply the "default" American identity (what
Americans think of when they think of the average American). As time passed, ''white'' came to
mean more than Anglo-Saxon as the default population of America grew rapidly with the newer
immigrants from Europe. The remained a single dichotomy of race: blacks and whites (which can
be seen as the dichotomy between "other" and "self' or "default" on the individual level) . The
problem of the two populations has plagued every administration from Washington to Clinton
(see "The Concept of Race as defined by the US Census Bureau").
In the days of American Apartheid, the race was used politically (via political-gain
mechanisms: see ''Democracy and 'Other"') directly to mobilize the white vote by exploiting its
ignorance and fear. More recently, it has been used much more subtly, perhaps even
subconsciously, by the Bush election campaign. The Willie Horton political advertisement
worked because it played upon white America's stereotype of the black male: an hyperviolent,
oversexual being who will rape and kill white women if not kept locked up. The fact that the
Bush campaign used the actual video footage suggests that there was a direct attempt to draw
attention to the fact that Willie Horton was black. By the same token, sometimes even more
directly, African-American politicians have played the race card to solidify their backing by blacks
in their constituencies. Marion Barry, who was convicted of using crack cocaine during his

previous term as mayor of Washington D.C., was reelected by the predominately black population
of Washington by playing African-American solidarity against his white opponent. The
mechanism for politicians is the same and the result is the same: divide the population in your
favor, solidify that support, and win.

Mauritian politics are notorious for ruthless use of what is known there as the "community
card." In this small country of 1.2 Million people, the Hindus, descended from indentured
laborers brought by the British from India in the 19th Century, hold a small majority in the voting
population. Small enough, that if almost all the Hindus don't vote the same way, the Hindu
candidate for Prime Minister might not win. But they always have, since independence from
Great Britain in 1968.
Several times, there have been serious challenges brought by members of what is known
as the "General Population," which is made up of the Creoles (mostly of African descent) and the
remainder of the original French white population (race doesn't seem to playa big role in
Mauritius politics - it is as appalling to a Mauritian that the US Census asks us to which race we
belong, as it is to an American that the Mauritian Census asks them to which religion they ascribe)
both largely of Christian (Roman Catholic) faith, but each time the Hindu candidate has made
direct appeals to the majority Hindu population for unity against the "other." The Hindu
candidates have even openly declared that Hindus ''betray'' their people and themselves by not
voting with their religion.
In addition to the mostly Catholic General Population of Creoles and French, there is a
sizable Muslim block, which also votes primarily as a unit, and the remaining Chinese who have
not intermarried or changed religion thus becoming part of another block. The Mauritian Census
asks directly to which religion and language group each citizen belongs (see Appendix G), and,
although the Office of Statistics in Mauritius denies that the Census asks "to which community a
citizen belongs," the Census does ask religion and language, from which the specific communities
can easily be figured .1 So the Mauritian political scene is one rife with problems caused directly
by political-gain manipulation of ethnic and religious groups.
In this factor the two nations are strikingly similar. Each country has a majority

population of one group and several strong minority populations. In elections, many times, when

there are two opposing candidates from different communities, the candidate whose community
holds the advantage of voters will call upon community solidarity to ensure victory, or when the
race is especially close, in addition to identifying themselves with a community, they will identify
themselves in opposition to another community. In Mauritius, this tactic has been used to rally
Hindus against challenges from both the Creoles and the Muslims. In America, it has been used
to mobilize whites into voting against blacks (read: anti-crime, anti-welfare, anti-affirmative action
- what are the white voters' stereotypes for each of these?).
These uses of the race or community "card" are examples of the political-gain theory of
racism in which political contenders or aides manipulate different groups into opposition for their
own political or professional benefit. 2 Political-gain seems to be the source for much of the
racial/religious/communal strife in Mauritius and the us. A politician who is in an unfavorable
position can increase his or her stock in two ways: first, by calling on his or her own group for
support, either by rallying around their own nationalism as a group or by uniting against a
common enemy (usually a scapegoated group), or, second, by splintering the opponents' groups
by setting them internally at odds with each other.
Both the United States and Mauritius are representative democracies that have a clear
majority group with a strong group identity. Both countries also had that same majority group in
power when their respective constitutions were written. However, unlike the U.S. whose
minority groups had no rights at all at the time of its Constitutional Convention because of slavery
and the war on the Native Americans, Mauritius has provisions in its constitution for dealing with
community problems. There are constitutional guarantees for minority groups that they will have
a certain number of seats in the Mauritian Parliament. 3 While this provision sounds fair and
egalitarian for the minority groups, it actually is a constitutional provision to keep the majority
group In power.

The minority groups of Mauritius must always show solidarity or else they will not have
access to these extra seats of Parliament, as they are based on voter support for certain groups.
As long as the minority groups are solid, the majority will remain solid as well in opposition, and
thus its control of the government remains solid as well. This system gives Muslims, Christians,
and Chinese a voice in the government, but as long as the system remains in place, the Hindus will
remain in control. As long as the Hindus remain in political control, the government will continue
to favor their group on all issues of concern.
An analogous situation of this paradox can be drawn in the United States. The American
minority groups' require strong identities to protect their rights from the majority, and this same
solidarity can also limit what can be achieved by maintaining the same power hierarchy that
caused many of the problems in the first place. For example, the problems of race in America are
well-known. African-Americans had to form a solid political identity and presence to win the
battles of the Civil Rights Movement, and there are still battles to be fought. However, the very
same solidarity along racial lines perpetuates the racial caste system which was responsible for the
original problems of race.
This is an uncomfortable paradox for proponents of representative democracy. ''Majority
rules" means minorities lose, and if the majority-minority system breaks down along caste lines
(i.e. people are born into the majority or minority and cannot change easily if at all), then majority

always rules, and minorities always lose.
Unfortunately for Mauritius, whose politics revolve around religion, people rarely change
from one major world religion to another, and thus, they have a semi-caste system which probably
ensure Hindu domination of the government for some time now. Even more unfortunately for the
United States, whose politics all too often break down by the folk taxonomy of race (see "The
Concept of Race as Defined by the U.S. Census Bureau"), which is a full-blown caste system (you
can't change your skin color ... yet).

There is a major difference, however. The U.S. racial caste system is an artificial
construction. There have been, are, and always will be religion and religious differences, but
racial differences are far more recent and much more shallow than religion. There are already
cracks showing in the American race wall, and while there are many, of all racial groups, trying to
patch those cracks, there are many others who are doing their best to bring down that wall once
and for all.

Conclusion'

Sometimes I despair at the state of my community, my nation, my world. Other times, I
am filled with optimism and hope that there truly is a better way and we are moving towards it. I
first encountered the issue of race at around age nine, when I asked to have a friend of mine over
for swimming at the pool at our local country club. My mother told me that I couldn't do that
because the country club was ''white-only,'' and my friend was black. It seemed like the craziest
and stupidest thing I had ever heard, still does in fact, but as I thought about it, I realized I had
never seen a black person at the country club that didn't work there.
The more I thought about it, the wicked world of race opened before my mind's eye. The
jokes and slurs I'd overheard, the way my black friends treated me differently than they did each
other, and one of my white friends who had told me that I should not be friends with the black
kids. Something that had never concerned me, never bothered me, never before presented any
kind of problem in any social setting, suddenly invaded every aspect of my life uninvited. Then I
was off to an almost all-white private school on the other end of town, cutting me off from black
friends and peers and throwing me into the world of blacks as "other."
A young child is never prepared for the world of race. They accept so much of their
world-view from their parents that usually by the time they are ready to·think for themselves,
"other" is firmly in place. Of course, that psychological mechanism is in operation the world over,
and, the whole world over, kids grow up hating and not understanding. They, who were once the
children, become the next generation of the struggle against the "other."
I think the future rests on each generation of children being educated that no one is
completely "other." If we can get away from racism and the politics of race, hate, and fear that
cause strife between groups that are very similar in core belief systems, we can have every reason
to celebrate our common interests.
I would like to thank the people on my committee for their patience and help in things
ranging far beyond this paper alone. Thanks to Dr. Hopson who opened my eyes and removed

the blinders placed there by too much TV, showing me the racism that still exists everyday in
America 35 years after '1he struggle" took place; to Dr. Jalata, who showed me the different
forms racism and its kin can take and that they are a world phenomenon; and to Ms. Hazeur for
showing me that the central issue in improving race relations is contact between groups which led
directly to the my research into "other" and how it affects our world views. Thanks also to Dr.
Broadhead for helping me get to Mauritius, and special thanks to Dr. Reese and the College
Scholars staff for allowing this to happen.

Appendix A

··· ..
........
. ... ...
.. ....
...
.... ......
··· ··.......
........
..........
··· ......
. ..... .. ... .
....

D

<11%

IHW1WiH 13-15 %

_

18-20%

W::::::::::I

11-13%

_

_

>20%

15-18%

6.9 Genetic frequency ffilpS for Rh - individuals (lbove) and B genes (page 146) in
Europe.

Appendix C
TABLE 1.-]'Ol'lJLATION 0.' THE UN')'rI!:O ST'\T~~ BY COLOU ('R

R.\CJ!l .AND NA'l'IVITY: l!130

==_

rPllr Count not :ihuwn wh'lr61~:i:i than 0.1 or wheru 1,63" I.; IU35 than 100\

__N~=--_

'rulal
IltlPllb-

P..:r

tlull

l'rl'

sa. U-I, 20-1, 119

B7. il:l,3lili.J(I;
Ok ~
{d. 1;21)
O. til
6ft. Ii
tif(i. i)'.i~. 43. 4
. 9.'1.~ ..___ 3.~~:;: _ 1•.'
aO.&iS -lJ.2
.a~.Ofill
~'i. !>
tll,3.'ii to. ::
70, 4i7 fl~ ~

Indlan :._ •• ___ , .. _ _1~~3lli

Hl1ldt: . •• _••• __
Koman._......
1II\wrJldo •••• _.
J\[oluy.........

N.\I.'i~

. d3S, 631
45,2Ot

45,O:,!fj

3.13(1

41'.l

1,11&'

!jIG

lill

Ntl·
Iiv\J

10t>.O 100. ( 10iio.
&1.7
II. ';'
1.:

bli. tl
II}, !1
0. 7
_ . O~ ~ . •11..3
0.1. •••. _
O. 1
O. )

£+i. I
O. 1
4. 3

.• _.~.

0.3
0. 6

OIUi

)~:.;

IU .•••••.••••• ••••.•

13. 2

2, 711>

Ij(j. li ••• . _ . .. . . . . . . _._.

.__ .,.
._____ ... ___ -....
~ : ~:=~: .___ .~._~~ ::=:::, :::::: : ~:::: ::::::
l

/lnl·

6.'i~

Uf

4~

1~

6ShUUt)SC.------r,Ulonn ... "'"

lUi

12.311

Wllite. _~ ••• . • _. illi\,lifl4.~.I' US,4!17,.-;rli
Nt'l.:m..... . ... 11, !>~~,!:ti 11.7 0;, ~~.~
r,lodcllO •. . .• _. 1, ·1.... 5;1; • .. _.~~ •• 8J~

Chincse........
J"I:
anlllill ••••• _'
}o.\ ipino_._. .•.•

To·

tubl

lubi

T.:Ilal.. __• 122. 776. OH 108: :'70. 607

lENT

I

c~~t ~lJllltcr .:~;t

Numlier

n:1t

._D_I::J_T~I-U-U_\J_:TI-O-~-.

'a. I)

0:). t
._.. __

1.(t;!

c;

511. !I. __ ..... __

a.li

-IS -- • . •. . _.... __ •. __ . __ . • _

Appendix D

I, ,hi. p.nonWhi'.

Ne,ro
.
American Indion
Japane ••

Chine,.

Filipino
HawaIIan
P(1I' Hawaiian
Aleut
Eskimo
(e'c,) 1

ll~

IPS)

'5. Color or race
§

~

~

g

. 0 ·...

;i~f

-~ ~

I.

0

c:::::~~

i.'!:..:::~
,
~ -~ cS ~ a -SI'(,c'(Y ofher-

000

0000

000

0000

000

0000

0

-

Appendix E
fdcsimile of questionnaire it~m 4.

4. Is this person -

'. J
~

FiJI one circle.

.;

'-'

<)

White
81.jc" or Ne~ro
Japan~se

Chlll~se

(; FIlipino

',.)

ASian Indian
Hawaiian
G GUdrnanidn
, ) Samoan
(j

' j

Eskimo

'.J

Kort!dn

'.J,

Aleut

', )

VI~tndmese

,-:)

Other - 5p~'ify ~

CI Indian (Arner )
Prim
tribe -+-

Illstructions to tht! respondent for questionnaire item 4.

0
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Appendix F
Figure 2. Asian or Pacific Islander Groups Reported
In the 1990 Census
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Asian, not specHied:?

'In some data products, specific groups lisied under "Other "sian" or
"Other Paciric Islander" are shown separately. Groups not shown are
tabulated as "All other Asian" or "All other Pacific Islander," respectively.
21ncludes entries such as Asian American, Asian, Asiatic, Amerasian,
and Eurasian.
3Polynesian, Micronesian, and Melanesian are Pacific Islander cultural
groups,
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Table 07 - Resident population by language of forefathers and sex

I.

language of forefathers

Both
sexes

female

Male

MAURITIUS
1,056,660

527,760

528,900

Creole •••. •

379,28&

190,566

188,722

Cantonese
Chinese ••
Hakka • • •
Mandarin.
Other Chinese

316
13,538
3,343
395
60

160
7,170
1,680
207
25

156
6,368
1,663
188
35

English • • • • •
French. . • •
Other European. •

888
22,367
229

402
10,486
101

486
11,881
128

Arabic •.
Bhojpuri.
Gujrati
Hindi.
Harathi
Tami l .
Telegu.
Urdu . .
Other Oriental ••

1,686
343,832
2,181
38,181
17,732
47,953
21,033
45,311
1,019

Si.9
171, lSi.
1,046
18,935
8,844
23,786
10,384
22,609
5.18

837
172,648
1,135
19,246
8,888
24,167
10,649
22,702
501

All linguistic groups

Creole
Creole
Creole
Creole
Creole
Creole
Creole
Creole
Creole
Creole

.....

.....

& Chinese.
& French .
& Other European
& Bhojpuri •.
& Hindi . .

- -

. -.

.

&Harathi.

& Tami l . .

& Telegu .
& Urdu . . •

&Other Oriental

Chinese' European • • .
Chinese 1 Oriental. : •
French &Other European
French & Oriental • ~ .
Other European & Oriental

i,*

,
i

h

Bhojpuri
Bhojpuri
Bhojpuri
Bhojpuri
Bhojpuri
Bhojpuri

8. Hindi . .

& ~arathi . .
8. Tamil . .
8. Tclcgu .

& Urdu . .
& Other Oriental

_

.../I

":".

.

2,439
15,023
1,100
34,371
2.316 __.. .
1,089
5,983
1,163
10,119
1,207

1,192
7,621
543
17,118
1,164
559
2,987
590
5,082
585

1,247
7,402
557
17,253
1,152 .
530
2,996
573
5,037
622

58
227

24
100

34
127

1,276
222
326

629
109
165

647
113
161

32,922
352
498
516
3,553
163

16,476
178
250

16,446
174
248
270
1,766
81

21,6

1,787
82

".''''

. -....,"..' -. ..-

.

.

-. ~

.. - . --

- ..

"T -
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Teble D5 -Resident population by religion and sex
~-~___

r

Rel igion

Both
sexes

I

r-Male

__ ~

Female

MAURITIUS

1,056,660

527,760

No rel igion.

2,339

1,441

891

Buddhist
Chinese.

2,766
847

1,464
470

1,30;

1,sn

1,74(
4,26,
53S

Total

!.::
.)

':' ;1
•

Adventist.
Assemblee de Dieu.
Bahai. •••
Christian.
Christian Tami l.
Church of England.
Evangelic • • • • •
Mission Salut et Guerison.
Pentecotiste Church.
Presbyterian •
Roman Cathol ic
Temain de Jehovah.
Other Christian.

3,312
8,236
1,134
31,099

528,90

3T.

4,399
274
1,013
1,978
578
287,726
1,663
659

3,974
595
15,795
237
2,269
131
485
935
293
143,958
761
317

24(
2,13(,
143
528
1,043
285
143,768
902
342

28
579
850

16
301
415

12
278
435

600
100

301
43
45
74
143,568
96
10,034
700
51
7,584
1,220
2,289
16,937

299
57
39

4n

15,301,

'.~J'

';:~.

Ahir
Aryan.
Arya Samajist.
Arya Samajist,
Hindi speaking
Arya Samajist, Other
Bengal i .•
Beboojee •
-Hindu . • . • • . • •
Kabir Panthis.
Merathi &Marathi Hindu.
Purenic.
Rabidass
Rajput •
Ravived.
Sanatanist
Sanetanist, Hindi speaking
Sanatantst I
Marathi speaking.
Sinatanist, Tamil speaking
Sanatanht,
Telegu speaking
Slnltlnist, Other.
Tamil and Tamil Hindu.
Telegu and Tclegu Hindu.
Vaish.

84

147
288,578
206
20,069
1,358
129
15,018
2,418
4,592
33,809

73

145,010
110
10,035
658
78
7,434
1,198
2,303
16,872

120
17

63
7

57
10

21
67

10
36

11
31

68,451
28,606
13,215

33,862
14,129
6,717

34,589
14,47i'
6,49~

.~

tS--

___ -.r
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Table 05 -Resident population by religion and sex

Both
sexes

Religion

Hale

Female

HAURITIUS
Vedic. ____
Other Hindu.
Ahmadhya •
I slam. • • •
Hohamedan .•
Huslim •••
Other Mus lim

• . 0.•

Other •••
Not stated .

55,155
811

27,562
"03

27,593
408

164
91,809
339
79,697
38

83
46,121
164
39,472
23

81
45,688
175
40,225
15

217

122

95

868

615

253
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Table 07 - Resident population by language of forefathers and sex

language of forefathers

80th
sexes

Female

Hale

HAUR IT IUS
Hindi
Hindi
Hindi
Hindi
Hindi

& Harathi
& Tami l ••

& Telegu ••
& Urdu •••

& Other Oriental.

Harathi
Harathi
Harathi
Harathi

& Tamil.
& Telegu •••
& Urdu ••
& Other Oriental.

Tamil & Telegu . • • . .
Tamil & Urdu . . • . . . .
Tamil & qther Oriental ••
Other •••
Not stated .•

87
196
81
88

92

45
98
37
48
43

42
98

4"

"0
49

"5

"

4

1

32
23
16

18

,,,

1"
7

9
9

750

365

385

1, OO~

710

295

2

3

2
2
3
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